The first “sort of direct” negotiations between the United States and Iran since the late 1970s took place this weekend in Islamabad with Pakistan mediating. Vice President Vance led the U.S. delegation, and announced that no quick deal had been reached. This is not a particularly surprising event, given that it was never going to be possible to quickly negotiate an end to a war chosen by Donald Trump, despite the evident lack of strategic clarity about its goals. Add to that the complete lack of trust between the two parties, and the evident difference in perceptions about the outcome of the air campaign.
The Trump Administration appears to believe that its air campaign has done so much damage to Iran’s military, military industrial sector and broader economy that Tehran ought immediately to offer a host of concessions across a range of subjects, including its nuclear program, access to the Strait of Hormuz, missiles and proxy support. Iran for its part meanwhile seems to have arrived in Islamabad with the mindset of a resilient party, able to absorb the kinetic pressure from the air campaign and able to inflict material damage on the global economy by targeting the Gulf region and the Strait of Hormuz. Minds thus set do not immediately meet for a compromise.
Both sides have now, as stated by Vice President Vance “given their final and best offer“, and it could seem that until one side fundamentally changes its mindset, these negotiations are not likely to yield a breakthrough. Yet, there are a number of reasons for why it is not likely that the negotiating process has already collapsed, despite the two delegations now heading home. Despite the failure to reach a quick agreement, the war is not about to restart.
First of all, the negotiations took over 21 hours, clearly suggesting that a lot of substantive issues were covered in detail, rather than just the two delegations reading out their prepared remarks.
Secondly, while the current ceasefire is scheduled to last 14days, it can – and once the alternatives are considered certainly will – like earlier Donald Trump deadlines be extended relatively easily. It is possible that the Pakistani mediators will try to arrange another round of negotiations before the end of the 14day period, but it is not a deadline that too much emphasis should be put on.
Thirdly, it seems clear that a return to escalation and Donald Trump’s “power plant bombing strategy” is highly unlikely to produce any new strategic leverage for the Trump Administration. A return to an escalated air campaign would merely reproduce the kind of Iranian retaliation seen earlier in the conflict, once again threatening global fossil energy market stability and general economic growth prospects. As discussed in earlier notes, the option for using ground troops continues to offer only massive risks in return for no strategic benefits for President Trump, so should not be considered a credible scenario. The threshold for a return to the air campaign hence remains very high and the strong base case is that the current ceasefire holds.
President Trump’s latest suggestion to impose a naval blockade is not likely to work, as Iran is likely to interpret it as a continuation of the war against it and retaliate against the Gulf region and the Strait of Hormuz. Unlike Venezuela, Iran retains the capacity to respond to such an action from the United States – that a naval blockade was not attempted during the air campaign underlines this capacity.
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Fourthly, the Iranian nuclear program has been the focus of often intense international negotiations for decades, and it defies belief to think that this issue could suddenly be settled in a single meeting, as a lot of deft diplomacy will be required to overcome Iran’s refusal to abandon its enrichment program and the Trump Administration’s insistence that Iran can never acquire a nuclear weapon. Similarly, Iran’s now much expanded missile and drone programs cannot be negotiated in a single setting.
Fifthly, as discussed in earlier notes, the war in Lebanon works on its own timeline, as Israel will insist on addressing what has likely been a surprisingly resilient threat from Hezbollah resulting in ongoing rocket attacks on Northern Israel – an unacceptable situation for Prime Minister Netanyahu in an election year. Hence, this conflict is likely to rage on in the coming days, but at a more contained level without for instance large Israeli air strikes on Beirut, and there is a limit to how long Israel can resist what will be ongoing demands from the Trump Administration to either wrap up or reduce the intensity of the conflict in Lebanon. Ongoing low-level conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon as has been the case for decades will likely not be a hindrance for U.S.-Iranian negotiations, and it may take some time – e.g. a limited number of weeks at most – to get back to this level.
Lastly, in the arguably most important near-term element of the negotiations – the attempt to reopen the Strait of Hormuz – the “facts on the ground” continue to shift, even during the ceasefire. Iran (without firing a shot) attempted to improve its chokehold on the Strait by claiming it had mined an area of the Strait close to Oman, seeking to force commercial ships to sail closer to its shores, enabling it to continue to collect “Strait toll” during the ceasefire negotiations (figure 1).
Figure 1 Strait of Hormuz Alleged Mine Threat (Map from ISW).
The U.S. Navy in response sent in several warships through the alleged “mine hazardous area” to highlight that these waters are passable, and potentially to actively seek to clear any Iranian mines encountered. These types of “non-kinetic games” between the U.S. and Iran are likely to continue during the ceasefire and negotiation period, but are not likely to lead to a new armed confrontation. Both sides continue to adhere to the ceasefire, while the U.S. Navy sensibly seeks to enforce freedom of navigation in the Strait, and Iran seeks to shift transits closer to its shorelines.
As discussed in earlier notes, Iran is likely to continue to impose a toll on transiting ships during the ceasefire negotiations, and will likely resist fully reopening the Strait until it as part of these negotiations receive some kind of political commitment from the Trump Administration that it will not be attacked again. The Strait for now remains a source of leverage for Iran in the negotiations, but since such a vague commitment not to strike follows from what is likely to be lengthy ongoing negotiations about for instance Iran’s nuclear program, it is an achievable outcome.
It remains highly unlikely that Iran will be able to impose a “Strait toll” on the Strait of Hormuz beyond the duration of ceasefire negotiations. Due to the importance put by the rest of the world on the normalization of transit in the Strait, should the ceasefire negotiations in the coming (limited number of) weeks fail to produce even a narrow agreement on this issue between the Trump Administration and Iran, it will nonetheless not see Iran’s “Strait toll” become a semi-permanent feature of the Hormuz waterway. This is simply an unacceptable outcome for the rest of the world, and not least China and the Gulf region. They will have agency here, and a failure to reach any type of agreement between the Trump Administration and Iran will merely see it increasingly sidelined from the process.
In sum, the first round of negotiations predictably did not produce a quick agreement, as only a de facto Iranian surrender at odds with the strategic situation today in the region could have yielded such an outcome. The 14day deadline is likely to be extended, and it remains highly unlikely that the air campaign restarts. Iran is also not likely to be able to impose a “Strait Toll” beyond the duration of the current negotiation process, or in the absence of any agreement more than a limited number of weeks.
Jacob
