Day 5 of the campaign against Iran brought broadening attack against the Iranian navy (including the first U.S. torpedoing of an enemy ship since World War II) and increasing use of stand-in precision bombs, e.g. laser-guided bombs dropped from bombers flying over Iran reflecting the increasing scope of air superiority enjoyed by the U.S. and Israel over Iran. The increasing ability of the U.S. to use heavy bombers like B1, B2 and B52 over Iran significantly boosts the destructive force of the U.S. air force over Iran and overall tilts the military balance further in the favor of the U.S. and Israel. This heavy bombing capacity will explicitly be used against Iran’s fortified military and industrial infrastructure, and as such likely make it possible for the U.S. and Israel to materially reduce Iran’s ability to quickly at scale rebuild and reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs once the current war is over.
That Iran has this time been unable to match the scope of the ballistic missile strikes launched against Israel in June 2025 suggests that Iran already over the last nine months have faces challenges in rebuilding these ballistic capabilities back to their prior scale. This in turn matters for when the decision to eventually end the current war is taken, as one parameter here will surely be the expected time it would take for an essentially unchanged and still motivated Iranian regime to rebuild its offensive missile and drone capabilities. At a minimum, especially the U.S. (Israel cares less about the drone threat, as the June 2025 war showed how they will be shot down before reaching Israel) will want to buy its Gulf allies adequate time to rebuild and expand layered Ukrainian-style air defenses against drones before Iran might be ready to threaten them again.
In the near-term however the military focus remains degrading Iran’s ability to launch missile and drone attacks on Israel, U.S. bases and the Gulf region. General Caine, the overall U.S. military commander stated in his daily briefing that Iran’s ballistic missile attacks are now down 86 percent from the first day, including 23 percent in the last 24h, and one-way attack drone strikes are down 73 percent from the start of the war. These are very high decline numbers, which should likely be taken with a pinch of salt, as they are likely to also be used to reassure observers and market participants that the U.S., Israel and especially the Gulf states have adequate interceptor missiles going forward. Yet, at least anecdotally it does seem like the attack intensity of also Iranian strike drones have been going down over the last day or two.
This will matter greatly also for decisions on shipping going through the Strait of Hormuz in the coming days, as the same Iranian drones etc. that face the Gulf region also will be used against the shipping lanes, especially as Iran’s navy has now been destroyed likely also de facto removing the risk that Iran can deploy a material number of sea mines in the Strait. Commercial shipping owners and especially oil tanker operators facing a challenging storage crude oil situation and potential well shutdowns if tankers are not sent in the coming days face the imminent decision of having to send ships through the strait without knowing the full extent of Iran’s drone threat.
Given this uncertainty for ship owners, the U.S. offer to provide a naval escort through the strait makes a lot of sense and could help sway some private sector owners to give the go ahead. Given that Iran’s navy has been defeated, that U.S. naval ships are in the region, and the Trump Administration’s evident interest in restoring oil exports through the strait, it should consequently be expected that such naval escorts commence probably within the next 48h. This in turn should possibly provide an early stabilization of oil market risk premia. The global LNG market meanwhile seems range bound now with QatarEnergy’s decision to stop all production, providing a minimum two-week restart period from now, a duration that exceeds the likely ultimate length of the current war. This should limit the amount of additional bad news to hit this sector.
In sum, the war continues to intensify and the military balance tilts further against Iran. The key parameter to watch remains the scope of Iranian drone strikes on the Gulf, and their implied latent scope to strike into the Strait of Hormuz, in which U.S. naval escort of tankers look likely in the coming days. The ultimate likely duration of the war continues to be guided by the length of last June’s 12-day conflict, yielding to another likely lengthy temporary lull in fighting between an unreformed Iranian regime on the one side and Israel, the U.S. and increasingly the Gulf region on the other. Given that Iran will be subjected to significantly heavier bombardment by the U.S. this time than by Israel last June, Tehran’s “reconstitution time” for any weapons programs are however likely to exceed the roughly nine months between last June and today. Renewed conflict might therefore not be that close.
Today’s outreach by Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian on social media to the Gulf region rulers represents the first public diplomatic outreach by Iran since the war started. It will not be the last, even if the end to the fighting likely remains some days away. Iran’s choice of outreach directly to the Gulf region also suggests that additional Iranian escalation against the region (e.g. beyond ongoing attacks against various infrastructure targets) and especially the targeting of their oil sector is now a somewhat lower probability.
Masoud Pezeshkian’s tweet translated:
Your Majesties, heads of friendly and neighboring states, we have strived alongside you and through diplomacy to avoid war, but the American-Zionist military aggression has left us no choice but to defend ourselves. We respect your sovereignty, and we believe that the security and stability of the region must be achieved through the collective efforts of its states.
Jacob
