The U.S. and Israeli attack on Iran on Day 1 brought several surprising events, though overall from a military point of view the campaign in which attacking aircrafts have already achieved full air superiority over Iran already looks quite similar to the 12-day war last June.
The successful decapitation strike that killed Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei at the start of the war is an obvious tactical and operational success that opens up Iran’s future in unpredictable ways. Perhaps the biggest surprise of the war’s first day is the increasingly indiscriminate nature of Iran’s retaliation through missiles and drones at Gulf region civilian infrastructure, while there as expected has not yet been any confirmed attacks directly on the regional oil sector.
The death of Ali Khamenei leaves an important power vacuum at the heart of the Iranian regime, which though is not likely to directly affect near-term military activities, but which will push Iran towards an uncertain future direction. Khamenei’s unique position as both the (de facto) head of state and religious leader of Iran and many Shi’ite Muslims around the world makes him arguably irreplaceable, as no one individual has both the domestic state and religious authority. Reports that his son was also killed in the early strike underlines the lack of any obvious successor holding both authorities. This means that the Iranian regime will likely face significant organizational change, no matter the ultimate outcome of the war.
It is far from obvious that the elimination of Khamenei will materially weaken the cohesion of the Iranian regime, and indeed his “warrior death” might well strengthen internal regime cohesion and produce a more hardline successor – we simply don’t know yet. His killing will likely also mean that who- and whatever replaces him at the top of Iran’s power pyramid may be further incentivized to produce a nuclear weapon – something Khamenei (allegedly never ordered and) never succeeded to do. Afterall, any regime who has seen its leader killed by a direct foreign attack will probably want to take out further insurances for the future. As such, it is quite plausible that post-Khamenei Iran will be even more radical than before, resulting in even more frequent military confrontations with the United States, Israel and possibly its regional neighbors.
The killing of Khamanei lastly does however offer Donald Trump a plausible “off-ramp” more or less any time of his choice, given that he can choose to declare victory in this confrontation based politically mostly on killing Iran’s Supreme Leader. This means that the probability of an early end to the confrontation in the coming few days have likely increased with Khamanei’s death, though remains well under 50 percent. An in Israeli eyes premature end to hostilities will also open up the possibility that Israel continues attacking Iran, even after U.S. strikes end. Iran’s dramatic retaliation against regional Gulf Arab states also makes an early end to hostilities much more difficult, as President Trump will likely not want to leave his regional allies at least partly at the mercy of a still functioning Iranian missile and drone threat.
Iran’s increasingly numerous attacks on civilian infrastructure across the Gulf region is a major escalatory surprise in the war from Tehran. It may origin in a – almost certainly mistaken – belief that such attacks can push Gulf Arab governments to put political pressure on Donald Trump to end the war. Given the experienced indiscriminate nature of these attacks, it is almost certainly going to have to opposite political effect now, as Gulf Arab states will have to contemplate taking a far more active supportive role in trying to bring the Iranian attacks to an end, having already been exposed to far more intense retaliation than they will likely have imagined possible.
That estimates now suggests that the Gulf region and UAE in particular (targeted by 137 missiles and 209 drones) has been targeted by more Iranian missiles and drones than Israel will be a major shock to local governments, even if the mostly ballistic missiles fired at Israel are deadlier and the Gulf Arab air defenses have actually performed quite well against the Iranian onslaught. Experiences from Ukraine shows that some missiles and drones always make it through, and there is also a further risk to civilian infrastructure from falling drone and missile debris and especially drones “led astray” by electronic warfare measures. The effect on the regional Gulf Arab logistics and tourism sectors however is somewhat similar, irrespective of what precisely caused a detonation in the middle of a civilian area, and Iran’s far more numerous retaliation will hence put additional economic strain on the region both in the short, and likely long-run. Visitors’ and investors’ threat perceptions concerning the riskiness of the Gulf region may have shifted lastingly upwards, at least as long as the current Iranian regime remains in power.
Despite the large number of attacks against regional civilian infrastructure, there have as expected not been any confirmed attacks aimed directly against the regional oil trade. Predictably, insurance costs and common commercial precaution have significantly reduced the flow of shipping to and from the Persian Gulf, but this must be distinguished from Iran trying to “close the Strait of Hormuz” or directly target the oil trade. Apart from declaring the Strait closed to “enemy U.S. ships” – the U.S. Navy will not care – Iran has not attempted to do so, and as its navy and overall capabilities are being constantly degraded by ongoing U.S. and Israeli attacks, looks unlikely to do so going forward.
Given the broad attacks on regional civilian infrastructure, a significant general decline in container ships, bulk carriers and other ships sailing through the Strait of Hormuz looks likely, a development that could relatively quickly cause some bottlenecks in the region in the availability of some fresh food for instance (much of which came from Iran incidentally) or other specific products. Yet at the same time, it seems most likely that larger oil tankers are likely to very soon find it commercially viable to sail through the Strait again. One early category of tankers to watch closely here will be tankers transporting crude oil to China, which may not operate on “normal commercial conditions” and which Iran for political and economic reasons will want to ensure has safe passage. As such, any decline in the flow of sea-borne crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz is likely to be very brief, and the associated upward pressure on oil prices contained. Today’s OPEC+ announcement concerning a 206,000 barrels/day production increase should directionally have the same effect.
The reported attack on a small Palau-flagged tanker (subject to U.S. sanctions for transporting Iranian refined oil products) in Omani waters does not constitute an attack on regional oil trade, but does together with other Iranian attacks on Omani infrastructure highlight the generally far higher than expected risk acceptance by the Iranian regime in its choice of retaliation. It is possible that the high number of strikes reflect a breakdown of central command and control, leaving it to local commanders to order attacks before risking the loss of their missile and drone assets to U.S. or Israeli strikes. If this is the case, a significant decline in such attacks should be expected in the coming days, as the political failure of the regional retaliatory strategy should become clearer to Tehran.
Finally, the question about the role of the Iranian people remains crucial. It is possible again here that the killing of Khamenei will mobilize regime supporters among the Iranian population in the coming days. But should be expected as air superiority has been fully established that U.S. and Israeli air strikes will increasingly also target the regime institutions in the IRGC and Basij militia that is directly responsible for domestic repression, potentially setting the stage for renewed local protests across Iran. The possibility for renewed popular protests in Iran therefore remains a key unknown to watch in this conflict.
Jacob
