Sometimes getting started is more important than getting off to a bad start. Undoubtedly, the initial impetus for this weekend’s reemergence of diplomacy was a problematic process centered on an unexpected and quite Russia-friendly “28 point peace plan” in the US press. Yet, at the end of the weekend, we nonetheless had the first trilateral peace negotiation between the Trump Administration, the Ukrainian government and European representatives in Geneva. Two competing or complementary plans depending on your point of view – one originally endorsed (though its origins remain murky) by the Trump Administration and a new revised plan prepared and coordinated by the Europeans and Ukrainians together – are now both on the table and out in the public. US and Ukrainian delegations in Geneva have agreed a new joint statement heralding agreement on a “updated and refined peace framework“, as well as “agreed to continue intensive work on joint proposals in the coming days. They will also remain in close contact with their European partners as the process advances“.
This is tangible progress and could well herald the start of actual substantial peace negotiations. This is a – certainly to me – surprisingly positive development, and a time-table for peace negotiations considerably faster than I had envisioned only last week.
At the same time, however, caution is warranted, as the aggressor – Russia – has not yet participated in this last iteration of negotiations and is certain not to like a lot of what has now been put on the table. It is hence unlikely that Moscow will quickly agree to any new deal struck between the Trump Administration and Ukraine plus its European allies. Indeed, we are likely still be very far from an actual peace deal or ceasefire being agreed, but as of this weekend, talking among the right parties appears to have restarted. And that is a major and surprising positive development.
Any peace deal by Thanksgiving will hence certainly not happen (and Secretary Rubio has already acknowledged this), and we should recall that large and long wars are complex and difficult end, as reflected by for instance that it took five years from 1968-1973 to reach the Paris Accords that finally ended the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. But this weekend’s meetings were good omens for diplomacy to finally at least commence.
The new Ukrainian-European “plan” or set of revisions to the original 28 point plan include among other things a rejection of any an ante land swaps or surrendering of territory in Donetsk, as territory can only be negotiated following a ceasefire, robust security guarantees for Ukraine including from the United States, raising the cap on Ukraine’s armed forced to 800,000, promise not station NATO troops in Ukraine permanently in peace time, no restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to join NATO or the EU, and how Ukraine will be fully reconstructed and compensated financially, including through Russian sovereign assets that will remain frozen until Russia compensates damage to Ukraine. These are very significant “revisions” to the original 28 point plan, and will not be immediately agreeable to Russia.
Going forward, negotiations without both warring parties in the room cannot hope to lead to an agreement, something true with either Russia or Ukraine missing from the table. This weekend is in other words only at best the start of what will likely be a very long negotiating process.
Ukraine and its European allies have clearly chosen not to simply reject the original “28 point plan”, as it contains several elements that they like. This in particular pertains to the language describing the kind of “security guarantees” the United States (and others) will be willing to extend to Ukraine. The leaked description hereof suggests guarantees not quite at the level of NATO’s Article V, but certainly far more extensive than either the Biden or Trump Administration have ever publicly contemplated. It would consequently be bad policy for Ukraine and the EU to simply dismiss this and the entire plan.
One of the interesting things about the public positioning following the publication of the original “28 point plan” was the unwillingness of the Russian government to endorse it. In a sense like Ukraine and the EU, Moscow has only indicated that the plan “needs clarifications” though could serve as the basis for negotiations. Given Russia’s continued military offensive in Ukraine, there is no concrete evidence of Russia’s actual intent to pursue peace, and Moscow is likely to eventually offer its own set of revisions to the “updated peace framework” agreed in Geneva.
There are many items among the 28 points in the original plan and the new revisions offered by Ukraine and its European allies where the language will require lengthy negotiations. Certainly the EU is extremely unlikely to grant Donald Trump or Russia any real say over what happens to the immobilized Russian assets in Europe. If anything, as noted before, the possibility that parts of the Trump Administration – in collaboration with the Kremlin – would have designs on at least parts of these assets will offer a powerful incentive for the EU to allocate these resources towards their own policy goals (e.g. Ukraine’s fiscal and military needs) as soon as possible.
It must here be emphasized that Europe has a very clear interest in “backing Kyiv to the last Ukrainian”, in so that it is preferable from a European point of view that the war continues at the cost of Ukrainian lives, if the alternative is a settlement that greatly weakens Ukraine. The weaker Ukraine is, the more likely it will be that Russia will eventually become emboldened to potentially attack also other countries, including EU and/or NATO members.
Since we likely stand only at the beginning of a possibly long peace negotiation, it will also be clear from Ukraine and the EU’s perspective (and maybe even Donald Trump) that the key to an agreeable outcome will be to maintain if not increase pressure on Russia in the period ahead. Particularly for the EU, this will present additional political incentives to agree on the Reparations Loan in mid-December, as it will signal the willingness to maintain support for Ukraine for the long-term.
In sum, this weekend have restarted a diplomatic process where there was previously none. This is surprisingly good news, but should not be mistaken for a higher probability that peace or a ceasefire is about to break out anytime soon. Even a restarted negotiating process is likely to last far into 2026 even in the most optimistic scenario.
Jacob
