I The military situation remains ominous for Ukrainian forces, as Russia appears able to maintain the mobilization rate of new forces to more than make up for the enormous losses suffered in recent months. Putin’s regime may simply be able and willing to “make them keep coming”, and gradually wear down defending Ukrainian forces, however heroically they perform. In the end, numbers matter and Putin’s ability to generate them from the Russian population to date has given Russia back the strategic initiative in the war.
The success of the Russian mobilization system and the continued willingness of thousands of Russians to go to the front daily, despite evident very, very high casualty rates moreover highlights that this war really isn’t just “Putin’s war”, but also “Russia’s war” enjoying substantial if latent support among the Russian population. This in turn means that Putin’s personal rule is quite safe, and that even if Putin eventually dies, his neo-imperialist policies in Russia will continue. Russia’s European neighbors should pay attention.
At the same time, however, Ukraine’s loss of battlefield momentum is also related to the stalling of Western military aid to Kyiv. Europe has been painfully exposed as a military industrial paper tiger, unable to fulfill its commitment to deliver 1mn shells to Ukraine by early 2024, while continued US military aid has for months been blocked by Congressional GOP infighting. Ukraine’s Western allies have hence been shown to be either weak (Europe) or fickle (United States). Ukraine’s ability to withstand Russia’s deliberately designed “saturation missile attacks” on key industrial and economic targets has hence diminished in recent weeks, as supplies of air defense missiles dwindle. In the face of fizzling Western aid, the Ukrainian parliament on its side has stalled on implementing a new and highly controversial military draft law for Ukraine, aiming to provide its armed forces with urgently needed more manpower to withstand Russia’s onslaught. The failure to pass this urgently needed law is not predominantly due to less Western military aid, but rather due to the obviously fraught domestic discussions of literally which groups in society should “die more frequently for the Ukrainian nation”. But the lack of Western aid hasn’t helped mobilizing the politicians in Kyiv to order more Ukrainians to front to say the least.
Fortunately, Ukraine is now in all probability past the military nadir in 2024. European efforts to produce and not least procure more shells for Ukraine is having an effect, as Ukraine can fire more of its shells from storage, knowing that more will arrive very shortly. Omens are similarly somewhat more positive that Congress will soon move on Ukraine aid, the date of arrival for F-16s with fully trained Ukrainian pilots and ground support staff draws nearer improving Ukraine’s ability to fight off Russian glide-bomb attacks. But perhaps most importantly, Ukraine’s drone capabilities continue to improve.
As has been discussed in earlier notes, drones now account for the vast majority of confirmed Russian battlefield vehicle losses, and as such are beginning to take over at least some of the defensive tasks of traditional artillery – in an often much cheaper fashion. Even more impactful perhaps in the longer run is Ukraine’s developing capabilities with regards to long-range drones and Kyiv’s evident willingness to use them against strategic Russian economic targets, including in the energy sector. The Financial Times reported that the Biden Administration has warned the Ukrainian government that these actions risks inviting retaliation and drive up global oil prices (in a US election year of course…..). Maybe the article is true, though it would seem odd that Ukrainians facing daily deadly air attacks on civilian targets would worry particularly about possible Russian retaliation. And it is not at all obvious that destroying Russia’s domestic refining capacity will drive up global oil prices. Russia doesn’t export many refined products (and its mostly diesel used predominantly in Europe), so while global refining rates might increase marginally from the destruction of Russian refineries, this effect is likely to be quite small and indeed negligible for US consumers. So, as long as Ukraine continues to refrain from targeting Russia’s crude oil export facilities in the Baltic and Black Sea regions (within drone rage), the destruction of domestic refining capacity combined with limited storage capacity and difficulty in shutting down especially Arctic oil fields, might see Russia forced to sell even more crude oil on global markets. This in turn would jeopardize OPEC+ agreements and likely necessitate Russia accepting larger price discounts, and in the longer run drive up domestic refined product prices and cut Russian government revenues from the energy sector.
Unfortunately, all these fortuitous developments for Ukraine are well known to Russia, and Putin will be aware that his recent window of Western military aid impotence and too few trained Ukrainian troops on the front may well close later in 2024. He is therefore a man in a hurry, and new large-scale Russian offensives in the Spring and Summer months to try to conquer more Ukrainian territory must be expected. A further escalation of the warfare at the frontlines in 2024 should be the base case, as should with certainty continued Ukrainian drone attacks on Russia’s strategic economic infrastructure in line with Ukraine’s constantly improving drone capabilities.
II With the recent final (or at least for likely quite a while) collapse of a ceasefire-hostage deal between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, an Israeli attack on Rafah looks imminent and with it likely large human casualties among the civilian Palestinian population in the area. This is likely to further isolate Israel diplomatically in the broader world, including not least from the United States and the Biden Administration. Given that many Arab leaders in the region secretly applaud Israel’s intended destruction of Hamas, one should not however – once the military operation and associated brutal TV pictures and social media storm are over – expect that Israel’s longer-term ability to normalize relations with say Saudi Arabia will suffer damage specifically from an Israeli attack on Rafah. Instead, Israel’s broader diplomatic challenges in the region stems from the Netanyahu government’s complete refusal to contemplate any version of a longer-term two-state solution.
The drawn-out war in Gaza and the deteriorating relationship with the Biden Administration however for several reasons make a further escalation of the conflict with an Israeli attack on also Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon much less likely today than some months ago. Firstly, Israel deployed overwhelming force in Gaza and by some metrics utilized more forces (four full army divisions just in the initial attack on Northern Gaza) against Hamas than against the entire Egyptian army during the Six Day War. An attack on Hezbollah would surely require at least a similar numerical superiority, essentially requiring the IDF to remain fully mobilized for the duration of such a conflict. This is likely to be very costly economically for Israel, losses will be larger due to Hezbollah’s stronger military capacity than Hamas, and this conflict is not likely to enjoy the same level of political support as the war in Gaza has had after October 7th.
Israel would moreover likely not be able to rely on “unlimited US military support” in such a conflict, given the strategic US need to support Ukraine, due to the fact that an Israeli attack on Hezbollah would have come directly against the political wishes of the Biden Administration, and that direct Congressional action could easily face long political delays as Ukraine has discovered.
The base case is therefore of an imminent Israeli attack on Rafah, but that this – unlike the situation earlier in 2024 – does not today lead to an imminent increase in the risk of further escalation in the form of an Israeli attack on Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon.
Jacob
