This note reflects a synthesis in views between Kim Wallace, 22V’s head of Washington Policy research, and the China Strategy practice.
On Monday, Chinese President Xi Jinping began a state visit to Moscow – his first since the start of the Ukraine war – with a closed door meeting with President Putin.
This is a trip with high visibility but one that is unlikely to produce concrete outcomes or appreciably raise or lower geopolitical risks. It is not going be the occasion for China to announce a deal along the lines of the recent diplomatic agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia (in which China’s role as broker was somewhat overhyped in the media). But neither will Xi cross Western redlines with an agreement to arm Russia.
The primary goal for Xi Jinping is to demonstrate to his domestic and global audiences that China is playing a constructive role in the conflict by calling for de-escalation, while at the same time standing up to what Beijing perceives as Western efforts to weaken Russia (and China). Xi will position Beijing as being in a position of influence in the dispute but without raising expectations that it will be the key mediator – a role that is awkward for Beijing given its close relationship with Moscow.
Alexander B. Pevsner, an Israel-based analyst of the China-Russia relationship, put the political dynamics well in a thread on Twitter today: both China and Russia are “using each other – China wants to present itself as a responsible stakeholder, whereas Russia wants to show that it’s not alone.” One example of these different motivations is that Putin’s pre-visit article in the Chinese media played up the “no-limits partnership” that the two leaders announced in their meeting in February 2022, while Xi’s article in the Russian media contained more nuanced (if still enthusiastic) language about the relationship.
Below is a bit more context for those seeking to understand Xi’s gameplan with the visit and how it will play out in global capitals.
Xi’s multiple audiences
First and foremost, Xi seeks to show his domestic audience that he is a great statesman and that he is standing up for Russia in its fight against Western “containment,” which of course Beijing also casts as a threat to China. The visit comes fresh off the annual National People’s Congress, which “elected” Xi for a third term as China’s president (see our NPC wrap-up note HERE).
In his meetings with Putin, Xi will be reaffirming broad support for Russia while trying to sound out Putin’s willingness to de-escalate the conflict and on what terms. He will also be trying to assess Putin’s sense of vulnerability, which will inform how far Beijing goes in providing additional support to Russia at the risk of further antagonizing the West. We continue to see Beijing as unlikely to provide lethal support (see below) but stepped-up economic commitments would not be a surprise.
Globally, Xi is playing less to the G7 countries than to the developing world – increasingly the key focus of Beijing’s diplomacy, and an audience that tends to be much less sympathetic to Ukraine and primarily sees the crisis as a source of global disorder of which the West is at least partly to blame. For these countries, Xi is advertising China as a voice of stability, contrasted with Western powers that have added to rising food and energy prices with sanctions and military support for Ukraine.
Xi may also hope that the visit will help repair some of the damage to relationships with European powers caused by Beijing’s support for Russia. That is probably unrealistic: European officials view Xi’s trip with cynicism and believe that Beijing still does not fully comprehend that defending Ukraine against Russian aggression is close to an existential issue for the EU. On the other hand, simply making Beijing look like it has potential influence in the conflict could at least make some European leaders less inclined to bandwagon with Washington on assertive moves against China in areas such as Taiwan or technology controls.
Finally, Xi’s main message to Washington is that Beijing won’t be cowed into reducing its support for Russia. At the same time, Xi is very unlikely to announce support for Russia that crosses hard political redlines; we continue to see a small probability that China provides major lethal assistance to Russia unless it is in a scenario where Putin is in danger of falling from power or suffering a calamitous defeat. For its part, the Biden administration has been measured in its comments on Xi’s trip while being wary of proposals from Beijing seen as advantaging Russia. It will be important to see whether Xi and Biden speak in coming weeks now that Xi is passed the politically sensitive period of the NPC and has made his trip to Moscow.
Limited upside
China’s global ambitions are rising and its diplomacy is evolving, so one shouldn’t rule out the possibility that Beijing eventually steps up to play a more active role in mediating the Ukraine conflict. For now, though, we expect Beijing to continue calls for both sides to “create the conditions” to begin talks. To the extent that Beijing puts forward a plan following the meeting, it is likely to be a framework that calls for de-escalation before negotiation – an idea that Washington, Brussels and Kyiv will all view as non-starters. Still, it will be important to watch whether Xi speaks with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky following the trip, which would be their first conversation since the conflict.
